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Translator’s Short Preface for the Historical Context 
By  
 
Daniel Fidel Ferrer 
From 1774 to about 1800, there were three intense philosophical and 
theological controversies underway in Germany, namely: Fragments 
Controversy, the Pantheism Controversy, and the Atheism Controversy.  
Kant’s essay translated here is Kant’s respond to the Pantheism 
Controversy.  During this period (1770-1800), there was the Sturm und 
Drang (Storm and Urge (stress)) movement with thinkers like Johann 
Hamann, Johann Herder, Friedrich Schiller, and Johann Goethe; who were 
against the cultural movement of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Kant 
was on the side of Enlightenment (see his Answer the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? 1784). Kant’s essay here is problematic, challenging in 
German, and certainly not easy to translate into English.  Remember: this is 
the way Kant wrote this essay; and if you can improve on his writing, I 
strongly suggest you go ahead. If you are looking for a summary of Kant’s 
essay, look elsewhere. Indeed, there are earlier translations that have re-
written Kant and make more sense in English than this translation (see page 
26). I did not re-write or “fix” Kant’s essay. This translation is closer to 
Kant’s actually wording.  I have added a lengthy chronology to give a 
better historical context of the three controversies (see pages 29-37).  The 
question of the main purpose of Kant’s essays (see my interpretation on 
pages 38-42).  
Where does Kant’s critical philosophy fit between rationalism and 
faith, between deism and theism, between some versions of skepticism and 
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common sense?  Whom should we consider as the guiding light of 
philosophy: Spinoza or Leibniz?  Were the Leibnizians crypto-Spinozists? 
Alternatively, should it be the promotion of Kant’s critical philosophy? 
Spinoza was considered an atheist at the time.  Accordingly, Spinoza was 
considered to believe in pantheism, atheism, nihilism, fatalism, and no 
personal God.  Direct path: metaphysics leads to pantheism, pantheism is 
really Spinozism, Spinozism is fatalism, and fatalism is in fact, and finally: 
just simply, Spinozism is atheism. Potentially all philosophy and all 
metaphysics, therefore, leads to atheism too. These fears were whipped up 
against all philosophers of the time. Kant was of course – contra atheism. 
F. H. Jacobi’s position was faith and revelation was the central 
source for our theological and philosophical orientation. What should be 
our philosophical, theological, and metaphysical ‘orientation’ in the middle 
of these controversial philosophical worldviews and positions?  Which 
direction should we go philosophically? Should these theology views 
dedicate our philosophical thinking?  
Kant’s metaphysical position before the first Critique of Pure 
Reason was close to Mendelssohn, but Kant was always very far from 
Jacobi’s position; although Kant does have place for faith in his 
philosophy.  Definitely, Kant had exchanged letters with both Mendelssohn 
and Jacobi.  Perhaps the one philosopher in this context that Kant was not 
interested in at all was Spinoza.  The spurious linking of Spinoza’s 
philosophy and theology to Kant’s first Critique of Pure Reason, (was I 
would claim), one of the main reasons that Kant was drawn in to the 
controversy (see Kant’s Footnote #6, page 19).  Kant did not want to be 
linked with any of Spinoza’s doctrines. Kant saw himself as contra 
Spinoza’s fatalism, deism, and the denial of human freedom. Thus, the 
Pantheism Controversy provided the intellectual backdrop of Germany 
philosophy from 1780 until perhaps the death of F.W.J. Schelling’s in 




[Start of Immanuel Kant’s Text in English translation]: 
 
What is meant to Orient Oneself in Thinking? 
 
We also may as high and advance in our concepts, and still so 
abstract from the senses, as they are still hanging but pictorial of 
representations (Vorstellung) whose real destiny is they that are otherwise 
not derived from experience to fit making of experience many other 
particulars. If we also wanted to give sense and meaning to our concepts 
(Begriffen) if they were not any intuitions (which is always a last example 
must be made of any of a possible experience) would be placed under? If 
we afterwards of this concrete understanding of action, the admixture of the 
image, first the random perception by sense, then so does the pure sensuous 
intuition in general be omitted: it remains that pure concept of the 
understanding is left, whose scope is now extended, and a rule of thought 
in general. In this way, even the general logic has come into existence, and 
some heuristic thinking method lies perhaps hidden in the experience of 
many other particulars of our intellect and reason, which, if we might 
understand them pull gently from that experience, philosophy, probably 
with some useful maxim could in rich abstract thinking. 
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Such is the principle on which the Blessed Mendelssohn, as far as I 
know, only in his last writings (the Morning Hours pages 165-66, and the 
letters of Lessing's friends page 33 and 67) are explicitly known, namely 
the maxim of necessity, in the speculative use of reason (which he 
otherwise, trusted in respect of knowledge about supersensible 
(übersinnlicher) objects, much so even to the evidence of demonstration) 
by a certain line means that he called first the sense of community (Morning 
Hours), sometimes the healthy reason (gesunde Vernunft), sometimes  
based on the simple sense (in Lessing's friends). Who would have thought 
that this confession not only of its favorable opinion by the power of 
speculative should use reason are so fatal in matters of theology (which 
was indeed inevitable); but that even the vulgar common reason when 
ambiguity where it made the exercise of such property, in contrast to the 
speculation, would be in danger to serve basic proposition of enthusiasm 
and utter dethronement of reason? And yet this happened in the 
Mendelssohn and Jacobi dispute between them, mainly by the non-trivial 
conclusions of the ingenious author of the results; [Kant’s footnote #1] 
although I want either of them settle the intention to bring such a 
pernicious way of thinking in motion, but the latter company would rather 
see as argumentum ad hominem [Translator. Latin: argument attacking 
the person], which you can help yourself to mere opposition is well entitled 
to the nakedness which the opponents are to use to their disadvantage. On 
the other hand, I will show, that it is in fact merely the reason, not an 
alleged secret sense of truth, not effusive view under the name of faith 
(Glaubens), to which tradition or revelation (Offenbarung) can be no 
coincidence of reason (grafted).  But as Mendelssohn steadfast and 
righteous zeal claimed only is the real pure human reason (reine 
Menschenvernunft), which he found it necessary and praised for 
orientation, whether though of course here be the high standards of 
speculative assets of the same, especially their own territory forming 
reputation (through demonstration) and disappear; and you, as far as it is 
speculative, nothing more than the business of cleaning (Reinigung) the 
common reason notion of contradictions, and the defense of their own 
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sophistical attacks on the principles of common reason (must be left over). 
The enhanced specific and accurate concept of self-orienting may be 
helpful for us, the maxim of common reason in their processing, clearly 
represent the knowledge about supersensible (übersinnlicher) objects.   
Orienting is in the proper meaning of the word: from a given region 
of the world to find (in the four we divide the horizon) the other, namely 
the rise. I now see the sun in the sky, and I know that it is now noon, so I 
know to find the south, west, north and east. For this purpose (Behuf) but I 
definitely need to feel a difference in my own subject, namely the right and 
left hand. I call it a feeling (Gefühl), because these two sides outward show 
in intuition no noticeable difference. Without this ability: in the description 
of a circle, without requiring him any difference of objects, but to 
distinguish the movement from the left to the right of the in the opposite 
direction, and thereby determine a difference in the position of objects a 
priori [Translator. Latin: from the earliest] I would not know if I put the 
west south points of the horizon to the right or to the left, and so should 
complete the circle through north and east to return to the south. So I orient 
myself geographically considering all given (Datis) sky but only by a 
subjective ground of distinction, and if in a day by a miracle all the 
constellations though incidentally the same shape and the very same 
position against each retained, except that the direction of the same, which 
otherwise east was, would now become the west, so would the next starry 
night though no human eye notice the slightest change, and even the 
astronomer, when he merely on what he sees and not at the same time what 
he feels overnight exist, would inevitably disorient. But so naturally to 
come to him which although created by nature, but familiar by frequent 
exercise discernment through feeling of right and left hands to help, and he 
will, if he only takes the pole star in the eye, not just notice the before the 
previous (vorgegangene) change, but also the same regardless of 
orientation can.  
This geographical concept of the process, I can now expand, and 
among them are to orient themselves: in a given space at all, and therefore 
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merely orient mathematically. In the dark, I orient myself in a room known 
to me, if I can only a single object whose location I have in mind touch. 
But here helps me obviously nothing but the determination of assets of the 
documents for a subjective distinguishing reason: because the objects 
whose place I should see, I see not; and if someone had indeed set myself 
the jest all items in the same order among themselves, but left what was 
right before, so I would be in a room where all the walls otherwise cannot 
be found (would the matter). But as soon as I am guided by the mere 
feeling a difference in my two sides, the right and the left. That is what 
happens when I'm on my otherwise known streets where I now distinguish 
no house, going in the nighttime, and I able to contact.   
Finally, I can extend this concept even more, as he then considers in 
the concerning, not only in space, i.e., mathematically, but even in thought, 
that is, logical guidance. One can by analogy easily guess that this will be a 
business of pure reason to guide their use, when they start intending to 
expand beyond all limits of experience of familiar objects (of experience), 
and utterly no object of intuition place, but only room for the same; since it 
no longer is then able to objective reasons of knowledge, but only to a 
subjective distinguishing fact in determining their own judgment to make 
their judgments under a certain maxim [Kant’s footnote #2]. This 
subjective medium, then still left is none other than the feeling of reason's 
requirement (als das Gefühl des der Vernunft eigenen Bedürfnisses). You 
can stay safe from all error, if one be underpins not to judge where you do 
not know as much as is required to determined judgments. So is ignorance 
of the cause, although the barriers, but not the errors in our knowledge. But 
where it is not as arbitrary, if one wants to determine judging something or 
not; where a real requirement and probably even one which attaches itself 
to the reason that makes judgments necessary, and yet lack of knowledge in 
regard to the restrict ourselves to the judgment required pieces: a maxim as 
is necessary according to which we make our judgment, for the reason one 
wants to be satisfied. When is it previously agreed that there is no 
conception of the objects could not even here to give something to this 
similar, which we represent our extended terms to their proper object, and 
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so they could secure their real due to chance: it is not for us continue to do 
until left: to consider first the term with which we want to dare us about 
any experience if it was also free of contradictions (Widersprüchen), and 
then at least the ratio of the object to the objects of experience under to 
bring concepts of the pure understanding, which we are not even 
sensualize, but also supersensible (Übersinnliches), at least suitable to 
experience many other particulars of our reason; think, for without this 
precaution, we would be able to make no use of such terms, but rather, 
raving (schwärmen) instead of thinking. 
By this means alone, namely, by the mere concept, but nothing is in 
regard to the existence of this object and the actual link it with the world 
aligned (the totality of all objects (Gegenstände) of possible experience). 
But now comes the right of need a reason, as a subjective reason to assume 
anything and to accept what they cannot presume to know by objective 
reasons, and consequently, in thinking; fill the thick night for us in the vast 
space of the supersensible (Übersinnliches) only by their own need to 
orient. 
There may be some supersensible (Übersinnliches) thinking (because 
objects of the senses but do not fill the whole field of all possibility) where 
reason nevertheless feels no need to expand to the same, much less to 
accept its existence. The reason is to identify causes in the world, what the 
senses reveal themselves (or at least are of the same type as so reveal 
them), employment enough to still have the effect of pure spiritual beings 
of nature to whose purpose (Behuf) is necessary; in an acceptable 
(Annehmung) whose rather their total need would be harmful. For as we of 
the laws according to which like meaning (würken) such essence (Wesen), 
know nothing, but of those, namely the objects of the senses, know much; 
yet can at least hope to learn: so would the use of reason rather happen 
through such final condition. So there is no need, rather, it is a mere 
curiosity, which runs on nothing but daydreaming, to investigate after it, or 
to play with fantasies (Hirngespinsten) of the kind. It is quite otherwise 
with the terms of a first primary being (Unwesen), as the highest 
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intelligence and at the same time as the highest good being applied 
(bewandt).  For not only that our reason already feels a need the notion of 
the concept unrestricted (Uneingeschränkten) everything limited 
(Eingeschränkten), and therefore all other things [Kant’s footnote #3], to 
lay the foundation so have we this need on the condition of the existence of 
the same, without which they are of the contingency of the existence of 
things in the world, least of all from the convenience and order that one in 
so admirable grade (on a small scale, because it is close to us, even more, 
as in the great) everywhere encounters can specify no satisfactory reason. 
Without an intelligent author can assume without falling into nothing but 
inconsistence (Ungereimtheiten), at least no understandable specify reason 
for it, and whether we have the impossibility of such expediency same 
without a first sensible reason cannot prove  (for then we would have 
sufficient objective reasons this assertion, and it would not be subject us to 
rely on the subjective) as a frugal subjective due to the remains of this lack 
of insight acceptable (Annehmung) same is that the reason it needs: to put 
something ahead of you is understandable presupposes this to explain it 
phenomenon, since everything they can connect only one term otherwise, 
this need is not rectified. 
But you can view the need of reason as twofold: first place in their 
theoretical, secondly, in their practical use. The first need I have just 
quoted, but you can see very well that it was only conditionally, that is (d.i. 
or das ist), we must accept the existence of God, when we talk about the 
first all accidental causes primarily in the order really out in the world use, 
want to judge. Far more important is the need of reason in its practical use, 
because it is absolutely, and we put forward the existence of God are not 
only compelled then, if we want to judge, but because we have to judge. 
Because of the pure practical use of reason is the regulation (Vorschrift) of 
moral laws. But they all lead to the idea of the highest good, which is 
possible in the world, so far it only through freedom is possible: the 
morality, of the other side on that which does not merely on human 
freedom, but also on the nature matters, namely, to the greatest happiness, 
provided it is distributed in proportion to the first. Now requires reason, 
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such a dependent highest good, and for the good sake to take that a highest 
intelligence as the highest independent: not in order of the unifying image 
of the moral law, or the driving force for their observation to deduce 
(because they would not have moral value, if the reason for movement of 
something else, as if derived from the law alone, that's categorically for 
themselves certain); but only to give the concept to prevent the highest 
good objective reality, that is, that to be held (zusamt) all morality will not 
be held for only a mere ideal, if the inseparable idea of which accompany 
the morality existed nowhere. 
It is not knowledge, but felt before [Kant’s footnote #4] need from 
reason, whereby Mendelssohn (without his knowledge) oriented in 
speculative thought. And, since this line means not an objective principle 
of reason, a principle of insights, but a merely subjective (that is, a maxim) 
of their own allowed by their place use, a corollary of the need and of itself 
throughout the determining ground of our judgment accounts about the 
existence of the highest Being (des höchsten Wesens), from which it is 
only a casual use to orient themselves in the speculative attempts on the 
same subject: Mendelssohn lacked herein, however, that he still dare to 
(zutraute) this speculation so much wealth for alone on the align road to 
demonstrate everything. The need of the former agent could find instead 
when the inadequacy of the latter was fully conceded: a confession, to 
which it his insight at last would have been if a longer lifespan (the teenage 
years more own agility of mind), old easily switch to change habitual way 
of thinking to change the state of the science (Wissenschaften), would have 
been allowed (vergönnet). However, it remains the merit that he insisted: 
the last touchstone of admissibility of a judgment here, as everywhere, 
nowhere, than to look for alone in reason, whether it liked it by insight or 
mere need and the objectives of their own wholesomeness in their choice of 
their principles (Sätzes) are passed. Mendelssohn cited the reason in its 
latter many other particulars, the common human reason (gemeine 
Menschenvernunft), because this is their own interest at any time first in 
mind; however, one of the natural tracks must already be entered to forget 
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that, and pointless to peek under terms in an objective consideration to only 
his knowledge, it may be necessary or not to expand. 
But as the expression: statement of sound reason, in the present 
question is still ambiguous, and either as himself misunderstood 
Mendelssohn, for a judgment of reason, insight, or, as seems to me the 
author of the results to take, a judgment from reason inspiration can be 
taken: it will be necessary to give this source assessing a different name, 
and it is not more appropriate than that of a rational faith 
(Vernunftglaubens). Every belief, even the historical, indeed must be 
reasonably, (because the last touchstone of truth is always the reason); 
alone a rational faith is that which is founded on no other data than that so 
contained in pure reason. All faith is now a subjectively sufficient, but 
objectively with consciousness insufficient to assent, so it is the opposite 
knowledge. On the other hand, if for objective, although whether lack of 
awareness, held true for some reasons; therefore, merely though (gemeinet) 
may be my one, but by gradual addition in the same kind to be of reasons 
finally knowledge. In contrast, if the grounds of belief by their nature are 
not objectively valid, faith can be never knowledge by any use of reason. 
The historical belief as of the death of a great man, the report some letters 
can be a knowledge, if the authority of the same place, his funeral, reports 
etc. testament. Therefore, something that historically held only to 
certificates for true, that is, believed, for example, that Rome is a city in the 
world, and yet one who can never been there say: I know, and not just: I 
believe that there a Rome exists: which is quite well together. In contrast, 
the pure can sense belief by all naturally data (Translator note. German 
word: Data) of reason and experience never know be changed, because the 
reason of belief here merely subjective, that is a necessary requirement of 
reason (and as long as we are human, will always remain) only presuppose 
the existence of a highest Being -- not to demonstrate. This need of reason 
to satisfactory theoretical many other particulars would nothing other than 
to be pure rationality hypothesis (reine Vernunfthypothese), i.e., an opinion 
which would be insufficient to assent to subjective reasons, therefore, 
because one given to explain effects can never expect other than this basic 
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and the reason it requires a basic explanation. In contrast, the rational 
belief, based intention on the need of their use in practical, a postulate of 
reason (ein Postulat der Vernunft) could be: not as if it were an insight that 
would do for all certain enough the logical requirement, but because of this 
holding for true (if in the humans all is only morally well-ordered) the 
degree of knowledge inferior to none [Kant’s footnote #5]; whether the 
kind (der Art) after it is equal to fully distinguished. 
A pure reason faith is the guide or compass, which the speculative 
thinker based on his rational quarreling (Vernunftstreifereien) in the field 
of supersensible objects, man of common but (morally) sound reason but 
his way, and probably in theoretical as practical point of view, the whole 
purpose of his may prefigure determination entirely appropriate, and it is 
this rational faith, which must be placed at the foundation of every other 
faith, yes every revelation (Offenbarung).  
The concept of God, and even the conviction of his existence, can 
only be found in reason alone, go out alone from Him, and neither 
inspiration nor by a given message, no matter how big of authority 
(Auktorität) first come to us.  Wider tracking by me an immediate intuition 
of such a nature, as they nature, as far as I know, cannot deliver me: 
nevertheless a concept of God must serve as a guideline, whether this 
phenomenon agree with all the what is necessary for the characteristic of a 
deity (Gottheit). Now, I now no one before, how is it possible that any 
appearance that of even the quality of performing whatever just think, 
never makes but look: it is but at least that much clear that: just to judge 
whether God, which seems to me what internal or external impact on my 
feeling, I keep him on my rational concept of God, and afterwards had to 
check, if it was not this adequately, but only if it did not contradict God. 
Just so: if even at all, which he discovered me immediately, nothing was 
found, contrary to what that concept: nevertheless would this phenomenon, 
intuition, immediate revelation (unmittelbare Offenbarung); or how else 
will call such a representation, the existence of a being [Translators note: 
essence, Wesens) never prove the concept (if not unsafe determined, and 
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therefore the admixture to be subjected to all sorts of madness), infinity 
according to the size enjoins distinction of all creatures, but which terms 
have no experience or intuition adequately, and therefore can never the 
existence prove of such a being unambiguously. The existence of the 
highest Being (höchsten Wesens), so no one can by some intuition first be 
convinced, the rational faith (Vernunftglaube) must precede, and then 
could possibly certain phenomena or openings give rise to investigating 
whether we use what speaks to us, or represents us well are authorized to 
keep divinity and after being confirmed that belief (Glauben).  
So if reason in matters that concern about sensuous objects, as the 
existence of God and the future world, their right, granted first to speak, is 
disputed: as all fanaticism, superstition, and even the atheism (Atheisterei) 
has opened a wide gate. And yet seems in the Jacobian and 
Mendelssohnian dispute [or controversy] everything on this upsetting, I do 
not know if just the rational insight and knowledge (supposed by strength 
in the speculation), or as even the rationality of faith (Vernunftglaubens), 
and created against the establishment of another faith, the one everyone can 
do as he pleases. You should almost close to the latter, if the one Spinoza's 
only concept of God, coherent with all the principles of reason, [Kant’s 
footnote #6] yet the reprehensible term looks set. Because if it is very well 
tolerate the same with the faith of reason to grant: that speculative reason 
itself, not even the possibility of a being (Wesen), as we should have to 
think of God, to see the stands: it can but with even no faith, and 
everywhere coexist with any assent to an existence that reason even the 
impossibility see an object, and yet, from other sources, the reality could 
recognize the same. 
Men of mental abilities and attitudes of extended! I admire your 
talent and feel love your people. But you also probably think about what 
you are doing, and where it wants to reason out with your attacks? Without 
a doubt you will, that freedom to think will get unmolested, for without this 
it would soon have yourself with your free turns of genius to an end. We 
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want to see what would become of this freedom of thought naturally, if 
such a process, you begin out of hand. 
To think of freedom is first place, opposite the bourgeois 
compulsion. Of course, it is said: the freedom to speak, or write, could 
force us through top, but not to be taken by them the freedom to think. 
However, how much and with what accuracy we would probably think, if 
we do not speak in community with others, we would think their thoughts 
are notified! So you can say that that external violence, which the freedom 
his thoughts publicly notified, the people snatches them the freedom of 
thinking: resist the only treasure (Kleinod) that all civic burdens still 
remains for us and which alone all the ills of this state, and counsel can be 
taken. 
Second, the freedom to think even taken to mean that it is the 
compulsion of conscience is opposed, where without any external force in 
matters of religion citizens pose to guardians over others, and instead of 
argument by prescribed, with anxious fear of the risk of their own 
examination accompanied creeds all examination of reason by early 
impression know to banish the spirits.  
Third, also means freedom of thought, the subjugation of reason 
under any other laws, as: they are themselves, and their opposite is the 
maxim of a lawless use of reason (by the way that the genius mentioned, 
continue to see than under the restriction by law). The result is more natural 
this way: that if the reason does not want to be subjected to the laws that 
they are themselves, they must bow to the yoke of laws, which gives your 
another, for without any law can do nothing, not even the biggest nonsense 
that propel its game long. So is the inevitable result of the declared 
lawlessness in thinking (an exemption from the restrictions imposed by 
reason) this: that freedom to think, last lost thereby, and because not as 
misfortune, but rather true arrogance (wahrer Übermu) is to blame, in the 
true sense of the word will be forfeited. 
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The course of events is about this. First, the genius like much in its 
bold sweep of as it has the thread, what else drew reason stripped. It soon 
charmed by other power spells and great expectations, and seems to have 
now set them on a throne, the slow lumbering reason graced (zierete) so 
bad, and it nevertheless always leaded the same language. The maxim then 
adopted at the top of the invalidity of a legislative reason we call common 
people fanaticism (Schwärmerei, enthusianism); those favorable of good 
nature but enlightenment. Because, however, must soon arise from a 
confusion of tongues among these yourself because by reason alone can 
command valid for everyone, now follows each of their inspiration: they 
must last from inner promptings outside through testimonials proven facts 
(Facta), from traditions that were initially selected itself, with the time 
forced upon certificates, in a word, the entire submission of reason facts 
(Facta), i.e. the superstition arise because of this but at least in a legal form 
and can thus bring to a retirement (Ruhestand).  
Because however the human mind still strives for freedom: it must, 
at once break the shackles, their first use of a long unaccustomed freedom 
in abuse and presumptuous confidence degenerate to independence of their 
assets of any restriction, in a persuasion of the autocracy of the speculative 
reason that accepts nothing but what by objective reasons can justify and 
dogmatic belief, but everything else boldly denies the way (wegleugnet). 
The maxim of the independence of reason from their own need (do without 
(Verzichttuung) rational faith) is now unbelief: not a historical, for the one 
cannot be.  Therefore, not thought of as deliberately as sane (because each 
one fact, which proved just enough is just as well having to believe as a 
mathematical demonstration, whether he likes it or not), but a reason 
unbelief, a predicament of condition of the human mind, of the moral laws 
first all the power of the driving forces on the heart, with the time to do 
them yourself behaving all authority, and causes the mentality that you free 
thinking (Freigeisterei) calls, that is, the principle of recognizing no more 
duty. Here now mixes the authorities into play, that's not civil matters come 
into the greatest disorder itself, and because the nimble (behendeste) and 
yet emphatic means is you just the best, it raises the freedom to think even 
 17 
on, and submits this, the same other trades, the national regulations. And so 
destroying freedom of thought, so even if they want to proceed 
independently of the laws of reason. Finally, the friends of the human race 
and of what is holiest to them! Accept in what seems to you after careful 
and honest examination most credible, it may now facts (Facta), it may be 
rational grounds (Vernunftgründe), and only denies the reason is not what 
makes it the highest good on earth, namely the privilege from the last 
touchstone to be of the truth [Kant’s footnote #7].  Adverse if you will, this 
freedom unworthy, they also certainly lose, and in addition pull this 
disaster the rest of the innocence parts on the neck, which would have been 
otherwise well disposed to their freedom lawful, and thus appropriate to use 
the world's best! 
(Translator. German text for the last sentence. “Widrigenfalls werdet 
Ihr, dieser Freiheit unwürdig, sie auch sicherlich einbüßen und dieses 
Unglück noch dazu dem übrigen schuldlosen Teile über den Hals ziehen, 
der sonst wohl gesinnt gewesen wäre, sich seiner Freiheit gesetzmäßig und 
dadurch auch zweckmäßig zum Weltbesten zu bedienen!”) 
 
 
Königsberg.        I. Kant  
 
 
Kant’s own footnotes. Labeled in the text as [Kant’s footnote #].  
(1). Kant’s Footnote #1. Jacobi, On the doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to 
Moses Mendelssohn. Breslau 1785. – Leipzig 1786. Results of the Jacobian 
and Mendelsshohnian Philosophy by a Volunteer. [Translator note: by 
Wizenmann] 
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(2). Kant’s Footnote #2. Orient oneself in thinking in general, therefore to 
say: be determined, at the inadequacy of the objective principles of reason, 
in holding true for a subjective principle the same (Sich im Denken 
überhaupt orientieren, heißt also: sich, bei der Unzulänglichkeit der 
objektiven Prinzipien der Vernunft, im Fürwahrhalten nach einem 
subjektiven Prinzip derselben bestimmen).  
(3). Kant’s Footnote #3. Since the reason for the possibility of all things 
necessary to presuppose reality as given, and consider the diversity of 
things only as barriers by them pendant negations: it sees itself compelled 
one possibility, namely that of the full system set than originally at the 
foundation, but to look at all other than derived. Since the consistent ability 
of each thing well in the whole of all existence must be found, at least, the 
principle of complete determination makes the distinction of what is 
possible from reality our reason only possible in this way: we find a 
subjective ground of necessity, that is, a need our reason itself, all the way 
to lay the existence of all most real (allerrealesten) (highest) being 
(Wesens) the foundation (Grunde). So now stems from the Cartesian proof 
of the existence of God, by subjective foundation (Grunde) to put 
something for the use of reason (which is basically always remains only an 
experience of use) predicted for objectively - hence need for insight are 
held -. So it is with this, so it is with all the evidence of the worthy 
Mendelssohn let it be (bewandt) in his Morning Hours. They do nothing for 
the sake of demonstration. Therefore, they are but by no means useless. For 
not to mention give what beautiful occasion this highly ingenious 
evolutions of the subjective conditions of use of our reason to the full 
realization of this our assets as to which purpose (Behuf) they are lasting 
examples: so is the assent to subjective foundations (Gründen) of the use of 
reason when our objective lacking and we are compelled nevertheless to 
judge, still of great importance, we only need what only wrung 
(abgenötigte) requirement is not for free access to spend to the enemy, with 
which we again dogmatizing have admitted, not without distress 
weaknesses perform, which he can use to our detriment. Mendelssohn was 
thinking no doubt that the dogmatizing the straight path to philosophical 
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fanaticism (Schwärmerei) is the pure reason in the field of the 
supersensible (Übersinnlichen), and that very same reason only criticism 
assets could remedy this evil thoroughly. It is true that the discipline of the 
scholastic method (e.g. the Wolfian, which he also counseled about), since 
all terms determined by definitions and all steps must be justified by 
ground principles (Gründsätze), really inhibit this nonsense for a while, but 
by no means entirely prevent. For with what rights you want the reason, it's 
time to in that field and it’s own admission, succeeded so well, denied in 
precisely the same to go further? and where is the boundary, where it must 
stop? 
(4). Kant’s Footnote #4. Reason does not feel, it does their lack, and acts by 
the desire for knowledge, the feeling of need. It is hereby as be applied 
(bewandt) with the moral feeling, which caused no moral law, because this 
springs entirely from reason, but by moral laws (Gesetz), and consequently 
by reason, is neither caused nor earned by the lively and yet free will 
requires certain foundations (Gründe, or reasons).  
(5). Kant’s Footnote #5.  For the strength of faith is the consciousness of its 
immutability (Unveränderlichkeit). Now I can be quite certain that nobody 
the sentence (Satz): there is a God, will and can disprove, for where does 
he want to take (hernehmen) this insight? Therefore, it is with the faith of 
reason (Vernunftglauben), not as be applied historical, in which it is still 
possible that evidence would be found to the contrary, and where you have 
subject still, to change your mind, [indeed] if our knowledge of the matters 
should expand. 
(6). Kant’s Footnote #6. It is hard to understand how scholars thought in 
the Critique of Pure Reason could find to advance for Spinozism. 
[Translator note: this could be the primary reason Kant decided to write 
this essay]. The criticism cuts to the dogmatism completely the wing (die 
Flügel) in respect of knowledge about supersensible (übersinnlicher) 
objects, and Spinozism is herein dogmatic; that he even competes with the 
mathematicians in respect to the severity of the proof. The criticism proves, 
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that the board (die Tafel, or tablet) of the pure conceptions of the 
understanding (reinen Verstandesbegriffe) must include all materials of 
pure thought, Spinozism speaks of thoughts, thinking it itself, and 
therefore, of an accident that it exists as a subject of its own: a concept 
(Begriff), which in itself human understanding is not and cannot bring into 
it. The criticism shows it not long rich to assert the possibility of a self 
imaginary being to that in his words nothing contradictory (although it then 
remains necessary, however, allowed to accept this possibility) of 
Spinozism is but to request access to the impossibility of a being whose 
idea consists of nothing but pure concepts of the understanding, of which 
only one has separated all conditions of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), in which 
therefore never a contradiction can be found, and yet nothing able to 
support this presumption (Anmaßung) by going beyond all boundaries. 
Precisely for the sake of this leads straight to the enthusiasm of Spinozism. 
In contrast, there is no single sure way to eradicate all enthusiasm by the 
root, as those limiting the determination of pure rational faculty 
(Vernunftvermögens). - Just so find another scholar in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, a skepticism, although the criticism it just goes to put something 
certain and definite proof as to the scope of our a priori knowledge. In the 
same dialectic in critical investigations, but which are designed to make the 
inevitable dialectic, which everywhere the dogmatic pure reason guided 
and caught themselves and entangled to dissolve and destroy forever. The 
Neo-Platonists, the Eleatic called themselves, because they knew how to 
find their own grill (Grillen) in older authors, if they had carried into those 
before, just been proceeded; therefore, it happens insofar nothing new 
under the sun. 
(7). Kant’s Footnote #7. Even thinking is the upper touchstone of truth in 
themselves looking (i.e., in its own reason), and the maxim any time to 
think for themselves is Enlightenment. Which now include, as much not as 
imagine ones which set the Enlightenment in knowledge, since it is a 
negative principle in the use of its faculty of knowledge and rather more of 
so to literacy is also rich in the use of which is the least enlightened. Of 
their own to say more, than all the things you should take, ask yourself 
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nothing use reason: if you would probably find feasible, the reason why we 
assume something, or the rule that from what you assumed to follow to 
make the general basic propositions of their use of reason? This test can do 
each with him, will see superstition (Aberglauben) and fanaticism 
((Schwärmerei, enthusianism) in this test soon disappear if it has not the 
same by far the knowledge to refute both for objective reasons. For it uses 
only the maxim of self-preservation of reason. Enlightenment in individual 
subjects to establish through education, so quite easily: one only has to 
begin early to accustom young minds to this reflection. But an era 
enlighten is very lengthy, for it can be found much external obstacles that 
prohibit some of those training system, and partly impeded (Ein Zeitalter 
aber aufzuklären, ist sehr langwierig; denn es finden sich viel äußere 
Hindernisse, welche jene Erziehungsart teils verbieten, teils erschweren).  
 
Königsberg.            I.  Kant.  
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Translator’s remarks by Daniel Fidel Ferrer 
 
  My translation is closer to Kant’s actual written text than most of the 
other translation; therefore, I did not re-write Kant to help the reader better 
understand Kant. I did not “fix” Kant’s text. I have generally followed 
Kant’s punctuation and paragraphs as well.  The text is difficult and I have 
add some ( ) to handle some of Kant’s long sentence. All translations are an 
interpretation – even mine. I make no claim that my translation is better 
than previous translations. Some of the other these texts are not translations 
at all, but are in fact re-writes in English. Given the difficult of the German 
text, this approach makes some sense for readers of Kant in English.  
Remember this was written in style of academic philosophy in Germany in 
1786.  
I strongly suggest you learn German and try not to depend on 
translators; or, read all available German to English translation and use 
them all. By the way, conversational German is not the answer to reading 
Kant’s text. Work and re-work on the translations of Kant’s text.  This 
translation is still green and the opposite of pauca sed matura (Latin for: 
few, but ripe).  Do not worry, I am still learning too. Caveats are too many: 
I am not a native speaker of German, I do not know conversational 
German, I do not teach the German language, I am not a philologist, Kant 
is not easy in German, Kant’s German is over 225 years old, Kant’s 
German is in a nice word: scholastic and the sentences are overly long.  In 
addition, I am not a professional translator.  Martin Luther who did the 
famous translation of the Bible into German wrote in a letter, “If anyone 
does not like my translation, they can ignore it… (September 15, 1530)”.  I 
did this translation to learn more of Kant’s German and to appreciate the 
text. This essay highlights the background of Kant’s philosophical 
development during the pantheism controversy. Of course, this has added 
to my greater understanding of the later development of Kant’s philosophy; 
in particular, the development and genesis of Kant’s thinking for his next 
major projects: the Critique of Practical Reason, (2
nd
) 1788; and even more 
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important for the origin and background of the Critique of Judgment (3
rd
), 
1790.  Who was Kant engaged with attacking? What were the questions 
that Kant was opening?  What did Kant want to achieve in the last 
Critique?  
Kant’s text remains open to interpretation, learning, and to thinking.  
Two dominant approaches to Kant, the first is getting Kant right and this 
belong to Kantian Philology (according to Heidegger); the second belongs 
to thinking with Kant and this belong to Kantian philosophy.   
Kant’s essay appears to be very abstract for many readers. Do not be 
taken back; but rather think in sprint of Nietzsche, who said, “Abstract 
thinking for many, is a hardship, for me, on good days, a feast and a 
frenzy". [Nietzsche’s notebooks -1885; 34 [130]. April–Juni 1885; “Das 
abstrakte Denken ist für Viele eine Mühsal, für mich, an guten Tagen, ein 
Fest und ein Rausch.”].  Go for the feast and frenzy. Let Kant speak in 2014 
and beyond. Do not let would be philosophical logomachies stop Kant from 
speaking or trying to expatriate Kant to the dustbins of history. We can 














“What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?”  
By Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).  
“Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?”  
Berlinische Monatsschrift (October 1786), pages 304-30.  
Berlinische Monatschrift. 1783-1811 (full scan of text for these years).  
http://www.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/diglib/aufkl/berlmon/berlmon.htm 
Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, AK 8: 131 to AK 8:147. “Was heißt: sich im 
Denken orientieren?” Academy Edition of Kant (AK).  Elektronische 
Edition der Gesammelten Werke Immanuel Kants. Normal citation format 
is AK, volume, and page number.   
In this case, the essay is Immanuel Kant, AK 8:131 to 8:147.   
From AK Volume 8, title page, page 131:  
http://www.korpora.org/Kant/aa08/131.html 
To AK Volume 8, last page, page 147: 
http://www.korpora.org/Kant/aa08/147.html 
General collection of Kant’s text in German (AA or AK)  






Some earlier translation from German into English of 
Immanuel Kant’s essay. 
 
Translated by Allen W. Wood in Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational 
Theology, edited and translated by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), pages 7-18. See the excellent 
introduction about context of this essay by the translator, pages 3-6.  
Translated by H. (Hugh) B. (Barry) Nisbet in Immanuel Kant: Political 
Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), page 237-49.  
Also, see Kant earlier essay in the same journal with my translation.  
1784. "Answer the question: What is Enlightenment?" By Immanuel Kant. 
New English translation and notes by Daniel Fidel Ferrer (2013).  













Pantheism Controversy (Quarrel) (Pantheismusstreit) 
Kant’s philosophy and theology is entangled in the following 
positions both for and against.  Indeed, other lesser-known philosophers are 
in-between Kant and these different philosophical positions.  For example, 
Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779) (Wolffian and translator of Hume An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals into German in 1755), 
Johann August Eberhard, (a Wolffian, 1739-1809), and Johann Georg 
Heinrich Feder (1740-1821). Johann Hamann wrote to Johann Herder in 
1779, that Kant always had books of Johann Nikolaus Tetens, (1736-1807) 
open on his desk (he was a well-known German follower of Hume). These 
are just to give you some basic ‘signs’ on the way to building a 
comprehensive view of Kant and his philosophy as it developed in the 
context of these philosophers.  In other words, the interweaving and 
currents of the intellectual period of 1785s is in reality a lot more complex 
than just these simple –isms; but these can be used as some guideposts as 
you make your own way. Nevertheless, you must get beyond mere 
philosophical labels, as I think F.W.J. Schelling is the one philosopher who 
understood this insight best when he wrote: 
 
       “It cannot be denied that it is a splendid invention to be able to 
designate entire points of view at once with such general epithets. If one 
has once discovered the right label for a system, everything else follows of 
its own accord and one is spared the trouble of investigating its essential 
characteristics in greater detail. Even an ignorant person can render 
judgment upon the most carefully thought out ideas as soon as they are 
presented to him with the help of such labels. But, after all, in an 
extraordinary assertion of this kind, everything depends upon the closer 
definition of the concept.” (from Philosophical Investigations into the 
Essence of Human Freedom, 1809, translation by Joan Stambaugh). 
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Kant’s philosophical thinking was against these 
movements. 
Against the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Urge (stress) movement 
(especially, Kant’s former student – Johann Herder  and also Kant’s friend 
Johann Hamann) 
Against Pantheism (Lessing, Spinoza) 
Against Skepticism (Hume)  
Against Rationalism (Leibniz’s version)  
Against Faith (Glaube, the German word for: “faith” or "belief"), revelation 
and mysticism (Jacobi)  
Against fanaticism or enthusianism (Schwärmerei) 
Against Common sense (Mendelssohn’s version) 
Against rational metaphysics 
Against Dogmatism (Wolff, at least the Kantian version of Wolffian 
dogmatism) 
Against rational metaphysics (attacked by Kant in 1st Critique of Pure 
Reason) 
Against Spinoza (atheism, nihilism (word first used by Jacobi), fatalism, no        
personal God) 
Deism vs. Theism  
Against the Spinoza’s nonanthropocentrism 
Against Systems as such (in Spinoza’s and Descartes’s view) 
Against freedom (Spinoza’s denial of free will) 
Against some version of Johann Hamann’s countering Rationalism with 
Awakening (Enweckung) 
 





Chronology of the Pantheism Controversy (Quarrel) 
(Pantheismusstreit) 
Section 1. Main philosophers and authors. Ranked by birth 
year.  
René Descartes (1596-1650) 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) 
John Locke (1632-1704) 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) 
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768)  
-------- Daughter, Elise Reimarus (1735-1805) 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714 –1762) 
Johann Melchior Goeze (1717-1786) 
Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719-1803) 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) 
Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) 
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) 
Markus Herz or Marcus Herz (1747-1803) 
Johann Erich Biester (1749-1816) 
Salomon Maimon (1753–1800) [Salomon ben Josua Maimon] 
Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) 
Thomas Wizenmann (1759-1787) 
Jakob Sigismund Beck (1761-1840) 
Gottlob Ernst Schulze "Aenesidemus" (1761-1833) 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) 
Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766-1848) 
August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) 
Friedrich Karl Forberg (1770-1848) 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) 
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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) 
 
Section 2.  Lessing’s first quarrel. Fragments Controversy.  
Fragments Controversy (Fragmentenstreit) 
1774-1778. Fragments by an Anonymous Writer (Wolfenbüttel Fragments). By 
Hermann S. Reimarus (1694-1768). Zur Geschichte und Literatur.  Deist writings, 
published anonymously by G.E. Lessing. Started the Fragment Quarrel 
(Fragmentenstreit). Lessing was famously attacked by Johann Melchior Goeze (1717-
1786).  
1775. Philosophical Conversations. By Mendelssohn 
1778. On the Aims of Jesus and His Disciples (Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner 
Jünger). By Reimarus. Published by Lessing.  
1779.  Nathan the Wise (Nathan der Weise). Is a play by Lessing, written in winter of 
1778-1779.  Note: this play takes place during the Third Crusade in Jerusalem in the 
year 1192.  




 in Wolfenbüttel, which is a town in Lower Saxony, Germany, located 
on the Oker River. Jacobi meets and held discussions with Lessing (who was the 
librarian at the Wolfenbüttel library [Duke of Brunswick’s Herzog-August-Bibliothek]. 
Lessing makes two unforgettable remarks that really stings Jacobi.  The first remark is 
about theology and his expression was “One and All” (Greek is “hen kai pan” [Ἓν καὶ 
Πᾶν]); this means pantheism.  Second remark is that Lessing said, “There is no 
philosophy other than Spinoza”.  This is the starting point and core of the whole 
Pantheism Controversy.  What does this mean for philosophy?  Many philosophers in 
Germany at the time considered Spinoza to be an atheist.  Following an atheist was very 
controversial.  
Lessing died in February 15, 1781 at age 52.  
1781. Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) (1
nd
 edition or the so-called 
A-edition).  By Kant. (AK 4:1-252).  Kant’s own personal marginalia is recorded at AK 
23:17-50.  Bound copy of the famous book arrives for Kant’s breakfast July 22, 1781. 
Kant was living in apartment on Ochsenmarkte, Königsberg, which was the capital of 
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the Kingdom of Prussia at that time.  Now the city is called Kaliningrad and it is in the 
Russian Federation.  This book is called the first Critique (two more were written).  
1783. Draft for the Prolegomena.  Vorarbeit zu den Prolegomena zu einer jeden 
künftigen Metaphysik (AK 23:51-65). By Kant. These are part of Kant’s notes against 
the Garve (written) and Feder (edited) review published 19 January 1782 of the Critique 
of Pure Reason. The first shorten review was published in the Zugabe zu den  
Göttischen Anzeigen von Gelehrten Sachen (Göttingen Learned Advertiser) and was 
published anonymously; and the original and longer version published in the 
Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek (General German Library) [Volumes XXVII-LII, part 
II, pages 838-62].  See Garve’s letter to Kant of 13 July 1783.  
1783. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as a 
Science (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysic, die als Wissenschaft wird 
auftreten können). By Kant. (AK 4:253-383).  
1783. Kant moves into his own house 87-88 Prinzessinstraße.  
1785. September. On the doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn (Über 
die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn). By Jacobi. This 
was about Lessing being a follower of Spinoza and a follow up to their discussions of 
1780.  
1785. October 16. Letter to Kant from Moses Mendelssohn. “Though I no longer have 
the strength to study your profound writings with the necessary concentration, I 
recognize that our basic principles do not coincide. But I know too that you tolerate 
disagreement, indeed that you prefer it to blind worship. From what I know of you, the 
intention of your Critique is just to drive blind worship out of philosophy. Apart from 
that, you permit everyone to have and to express opinions that differ from your own.” 
Later in the letter: “All in all this work of Herr Jacobi is an unusual mixture, an almost 
monstrous birth, with the head of Goethe, the body of Spinoza, and the feet of Lavater.” 
[AK 10:413-414].  
1785. October. Morning hours or lectures about God's existence. (Morgenstunden oder 
Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes). By Mendelssohn.  
1785. October-November-December.  Mendelsshohn is writing the book To Lessing's 
Friends. 
1786. To Lessing's Friends (An die Freunde Lessings). By Mendelsshohn (published 
posthumously). He took this manuscript to his publisher Voss and Sohn, and in the 
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process forgot his overcoat on December 31, 1785; and he caught a cold and died. The 
popular newspaper account was that Jacobi had caused Mendelsshohn death. 
Mendelsshohn died January 4, 1786 in Berlin.  
 
1786. January. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften). By Kant. (AK 4:465-565).  
1786. 7 April. Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz. (AK 10:442-443). Signed: most obedient 
faithful servant, I. Kant.  Kant writes, “The Jacobi controversy is nothing serious; it is 
only an affection of inspired fanaticism? trying to make a name for itself and is hardly 
worthy of a serious refutation. It is possible that I shall publish something in the 
Berliner Monatsschrift to expose this humbug (Gaukelwerk or deception).” 
 
1786. 11 June. Johann Erich Biester’s (one of Kant’s friends and editor, 1749-1834) 
wrote a letter to Kant. (AK 10:453-458).  This letter finally provoked Kant to get 
involved in the Pantheism Controversy. Kant was not in agreement with Jacobi; and 
Kant had to make a public statement on this essential point. This lead Kant immediately 
to write and publish the essay: What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? And 
against any link of Kant’s philosophy with Spinoza (mentioned by name in this letter).  
1786. 11 June.  Biester’s letter to Kant.  “Only you, dearest, most excellent man, I 
implore you to throw your healing Stone of Minerva on the raving fanatics; reject your 
initial plan and at least tell the public explicitly and immediately that Herr J. has 
misunderstood you and that you can never be an ally of the Christian Society for the 
Advancement of Atheism and Fanaticism.” [AK 10:456] “But everyone must be pained 
by the damage to the good cause and to the person if it can be made to appear that the 
greatest philosopher of our country and philosophy in general can be accused of 
supporting dogmatic atheism. This loathsome accusation might then make an 
impression, an impression which would however be totally weakened if you had 
previously declared your distance from any connection with this fanatic atheism.” [AK 
10:457].  This letter must have provoked and disturbed Kant from his slumber.  
1786. May. Results of the Jacobian and Mendelsshohnian Philosophy by a Volunteer 
(Die Resultate der Jacobischen und Mendelssohnschen Philosophie kritisch untersucht 
von einem Freywilligen). By Wizenmann.  
 
1786. August. Died: Friedrich II was King in Prussia (1740–1786) of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty.  Next was Frederick William II was King of Prussia from 1786 until 1797, 
then Friedrich William III was King of Prussia from 1797 to 1840.  
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1786-1787. August. Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (Briefe über die Kantische 
Philosophie ). By Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Last installment published in September 
1787.  These published letters made Kant famous during his lifetime.  Reinhold re-
wrote Kant as doing theology, and hence begun the marketing of Kant’s philosophy as 
theology.  
 
1786. August. Some Remarks on L. H. Jakob’s Examination of Mendelssohn’s 
Morgenstunden (Einige Bemerkungen zu Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s Prüfung der 
Mendelssohn’schen Morgenstunden). By Kant. (AK 8:149-155).  
*** 1786. October. What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? (Was heißt: sich im 
Denken orientieren?).  By Kant. (AK 8:131-147).  
1786. Herder’s letter to Gleim. “I am a Spinozist” (“Ich bin ein Spinozist”).  
1787. February. To professor Kant from the author of the results of Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn's Philosophy (An den Herrn Professor Kant von dem Verfasser der 
Resultate der Jacobischen und Mendelssohnschen Philosophie). By Wizenmann. 
1787. God: Some Conversations  (Gott: einige Gespräche). By Herder.  
 
1787. David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism (David Hume Über den Glauben, 
oder Idealismus und Realismus). By Jacobi. 
1787. Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) (2
nd
 or B-edition). By Kant. 
(AK 3:1-552).   
1788. Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der practischen Vernunft). By Kant.  (AK 
5:1-164). 
1789. 30 August. Kant’s letter to Jacobi. “I have always thought it my duty to show 
respect for men of talent, science, and justice, no matter how far our opinions may 
differ. You will, I hope, appraise my essay on orientation, in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, from this perspective. I was requested by various people to cleanse 
myself of the suspicion of Spinozism, and therefore, contrary to my inclination, I wrote 
this essay. I hope you will find in it no trace of deviation from the principle I have just 
affirmed. With inner pain I have read some other attacks upon your views and those of 
some of your worthy friends, and I have even spoken out against such attacks.”[AK 
11:76-77].  
1789. 16 November. Letter from Jacobi to Kant. “As you are my teacher! As you are a 
man whom I already admired with a pounding heart when I was young and before 
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whom I would now bow with veneration as before a great conqueror and wise lawgiver 
in the realm of science, were I to say this of you publicly at a time and in circumstances 
in which no shadow of suspicion could be aroused that I was guilty of self-serving 
flattery. You yourself, most esteemed Kant, mention your essay "On Orientation," that 
appeared in the Berliner Monatsschrift; and you mention it in such a way as not only to 
silence any complaint from my lips but to erase completely and forever even the faintest 
grievance that might yet be stirred up in my heart. None of your admirers can exceed 
me in the reverence and affection which I feel for you.” [AK 11:102].  
1790. Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft). By Kant (2
nd
 edition 
1793). (AK 5:165-485).  
1790. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (Versuch über die 
Transcendentalphilosophie).  By Salomon Maimon. Kant in a letter to Marcus Herz 
says, “none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Herr Maimon 
does.” (AK 11:48 -54). May 26, 1789 lengthy letter to Marcus Herz.  
1791. Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) writes in his roommate and 
friend’s yearbook, that is, in Hegel yearbook of 1791 we find an inscription in Greek 
the words are:  “S. Ἓν καὶ Πᾶ” or “S. hen kai pan”, “One and All”.  The capital letter 
“S” is abbreviation for the word Symbolum (Latin word for symbol).  This Greek 
expression was used by Lessing, and as such was noted by Jacobi.  Considered the 
overall motto for Pantheism.  
 
1793. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen 
der bloßen Vernunft). By Kant (2
nd
 edition 1794). (AK 6:1-202).  The actual Preface is 
dated 6 January 1794; however, Kant had sent the entire book to the theological faculty 
in late August of 1792. 
1794. Spinozism and Brief Presentation of the Spinozistic System (Spinozismus and 
Kurze Darstellung des Spinozistischen Systems). By Schleiermacher.  
1795. 6 January. Schelling’s letter to Hegel. “Now I am working on an Ethics à la 
Spinoza – it shall establish the highest principles of all philosophy, the principles in 
which the theoretical and practical are united…” 
 
1795. Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein 
philosophischer Entwurf). By Kant.  




 July. Fichte’s letter to Reinhold about Schelling. “I am most pleased by his 
inclination towards Spinoza by whose system my system can best be explained.” 
1795. Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten in zwei Teilen). By Kant.  
1796. 23 July. Kant retires from lecturing in the middle of the semester (some reports 
suggest that Kant had stopped lecturing as early as 1793).  
1797. Hyperion or The Hermit in Greece (Hyperion oder Der Eremit in Griechenland). 
Volume 1 in 1797, Volume 2 in 1799.  By Hölderlin. 
“To be one with all—this is the life divine, this is man's heaven. 
To be one with all that lives, to return in blessed self-forgetfulness into the All of 
Nature—this is the pinnacle of thoughts and joys, this the sacred mountain peak, the 
place of eternal rest, where the noonday loses its oppressive heat and the thunder its 
voice and the boiling sea is as the heaving field of grain.” 
Atheism dispute (Atheismusstreit) starts. 
1798 to 1799. Atheism dispute (Atheismusstreit). Friedrich Karl Forberg and Fichte. In 
1799, Fichte is dismissed from University of Jena, April 1, 1799.  
 
1798. Development of the concept of religion (Entwickelung des Begriffs der Religion). 
By Friedrich Karl Forberg. Published in the Philosophisches Journal 8, 1, pages 21-46, 
edited by Fichte.  
1798. On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance (Über den Grund 
unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung). By Fichte.  
1798. Autumn. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and William Wordsworth (1850) 
travel to Germany.  Wordsworth lived for a while in Goslar, Germany.  
1798. 18 December. “Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar court” by Frederick 
Augustus I of Saxony; and “Weimar rescript the University of Jena” by Karl August, 
Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach.    
 
1799. 9 January. Appeal to the Public: A writing one is requested to read before 
confiscating (Appellation an das Publikum). By Fichte. 
 
1799. On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (Über die Religion: reden an die 
Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern). By Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834).  
 
1799. Open Letter to Fichte (Sendschreiben an Fichte). By Jacobi. Used the term 
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nihilism (maybe first usage).  
 
1799. 1 April. Fichte is dismissed from University of Jena. Flees to Berlin.  
 
1799. 7 August. Declaration Regarding Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (Erklärung in 
Beziehung auf Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre). By Kant. (AK 12:370-371).   
Kant says at the end, “Nevertheless the critical philosophy must remain confident of its 
irresistible propensity to satisfy the theoretical as well as the moral, practical purposes 
of reason, confident that no change of opinions, no touching up or reconstruction into 
some other form, is in store for it; the system of the Critique rests on a fully secured 
foundation, established forever; it will prove to be indispensable too for the noblest ends 
of mankind in all future ages.” [AK 12: 371].  
 
1799. 6 April. Letter from Reinhold to Fichte.   
 
1799. 5 July. Fichte questioned by police in Berlin.  
 
1800. January. From a Private Letter (Aus einem Privatschreiben). By Fichte. 
 
1800. January.  The Vocation of Man (Die Bestimmung des Menschen). By Fichte.  
 
1800. September.  Concluding remarks by the Editor. By Fichte.  
 
1802. July. Faith and Knowledge (Glauben und Wissen). By Hegel.  
 
1804. 12 February. Immanuel Kant dies at the age of 79.  
1809. Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom (Philosophische 
Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit 
zusammenhängenden Gegenstände). By Schelling. Short title called "Freiheitsschrift".  
1811. On Devine things and their Revelation (Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer 
Offenbarung). By Jacobi. Attack by Jacobi against Schelling as an atheist.  
1812.  F.W.J. Schelling’s Monument to the writing of the Divine things of the Lord, etc. 
Mr. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: and his made the same accusation of a deliberately 
deceptive, lying, speaking atheism (F.W.J. Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von den 
göttlichen Dingen &c. des Herrn Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: und der ihm in derselben 
gemachten Beschuldigung eines absichtlich täuschenden, Lüge redenden Atheismus). 
By Schelling.  Very successful counterattack by Schelling against Jacobi.  Schelling 
uses this as the Motto of the book, here he quotes Spinoza’s remarkable statement, “Oh, 
what pain! We have now reached the point where those who openly admit that they 
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have no idea of God and would not know God in any way, that they cannot help being 
stupid enough to accuse the philosophers of atheism.” At this point, Jacobi was finished 
philosophically at the hands of Schelling; Jacobi died March 10, 1819.  


















What is the Purpose of Kant’s Orientation Essay? 
By  
Daniel Fidel Ferrer 
 
Indeed, Kant bounced off the Pantheism Controversy after realizing 
that the Pantheism Controversy was delaying the popular reception of 
Kant’s own critical philosophy.  In this way, Kant’s attack was a 
philosophical marketing attack. Kant was not going down in the popular 
media without a battle for his critical philosophy.  What is the place of faith 
in our onto-theo-logical philosophy?  Strictly speaking, Kant wanted to 
make room for faith (Translator’s FN#1) ---yes, but not much room for 
faith because the final anvil for the assessment of truth is not revelation, 
Bible, or faith; but rather, the final philosophical methodology and thinking 
for truth is reason (ratio). Rationalism is the official answer to the general 
question – how to orient ourselves in the philosophical world. On this 
account, Kant’s rationalism is a special limited view of rationalism, an 
empirical, practical, based on freedom; and yet, rationalism and reason is 
still the chief source and anvil of truth. Thus, it is not Hume’s Skepticism, 
not Mendelssohn’s common sense and his form of old rational metaphysics 
(Kant denied this in the first Critique); certainly not the rational dogmatism 
of Wolff (in fact, some part of Wolff’s philosophy was empiricism).  In 
addition, Kant did not see Jacobi’s concepts of revelation or faith as the 
only acceptable and final answer in metaphysics or theological disputes.  
Kant has also rejected the empiricism version of John Locke (1632-1704) 
in the first Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.  Kant new brand of philosophy 
mixes in his concept of freedom and practical morality to find the answer 
for Kant’s critical and enlightenment philosophy.  Even though Kant lived 
in isolation in northern Prussia and he did not travel outside of region; he 
still wanted to be cosmopolitan in outlook and worldview.  Part of his 
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family heritage was from Scotland even thought Kant did not know 
English. Many of his friends did know the English language.   
Kant often wanted more from metaphysics, ontology, and 
philosophy then they could give back to him; hence, his general passage 
into theology. The elder Kant wants to open up some kind of access and 
relationship to the supersensible (Übersinnliches). Note: Kant like teaching 
his theology lectures (4 times, 1774, 1783-84, 1785-86, 1787).  According 
to John Zammito, Kant had made a strong ethical turn and breakthrough in 
the first four month of 1790. As with most philosophical issues, most 
especially in Kant’s thinking there are many mixed messages, see for 
example, his essay on the conflict between the philosophy faculty and the 
theology faculty, written around 1794  [AK 7:17-26]. Indeed, Kant always 
wanted “more”, in fact lots ‘more’; but his intellectual honesty was a deep 
part of his mind set. This warp and weft is basic feature of Kant’s 
philosophical writings. Given the fact of how much of Kant’s philosophy 
has been work on and re-worked (ramifying) these features can be clearly 
seen in the larger Kantian tradition. Kant had lectured at the University for 
41 years and had been active writing philosophy from first philosophical 
work in 1749 at age 29. Strictly speaking, Kant did not have a complete 
plan for his system when he first started down the path of philosophical 
development. 
Two letters by Kant give you an idea of his own outlines of his 
philosophical planning. The first was his plans for the book that became the 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781).  
Kant letter 1772, “…and was then making plans for a work that 
might perhaps have the title, "The Limits of Sense and Reason." I planned 
to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part 
would have two sections, (I) general phenomenology and (2) metaphysics, 
but this only with regard to its nature and method. The second part likewise 
would have two sections, (1) the universal principles of feeling, taste, and 
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sensuous desire and (2) the basic principles of morality.” To Marcus Herz, 
February 21, 1772. (AK 10:129-130). 
Second. Kant’s overall plan for his system can been seen from this 
letter. “I shall be glad when I have finished my transcendental philosophy, 
which is actually a critique of pure reason, as then I can turn to 
metaphysics, which has only two parts, the metaphysics of nature and the 
metaphysics of morals, of which I shall present the latter first. I therefore 
look forward to the future.” To Marcus Herz, toward end of 1773. (AK 
10:145).  
Kant’s great system was seen as a work in-progress by 
contemporaries; and of course this lead to the greatness of Fichte, early 
Schelling, Hegel, and the later Schelling.  Even though the later Schelling’s 
philosophy was not a philosophical system to be followed; but rather, many 
philosophers critical engaged Schelling and were able to move on their 
own path as the Hegelian schools started to come apart.  Schelling’s so 
called students at the Berlin University in 1841, Lecture Hall No. 6, were 
Søren Kierkegaard, Mikhail Bakunin, Jacob Burckhardt, Alexander von 
Humboldt, and Friedrich Engels.  Afterwards, they all attacked Schelling. 
Indirectly, there was also the influence through Engels to Karl Marx (see 
Marx’s letter to Feuerbach, October 3, 1843 against Schelling).  
Schelling has his own way of re-thinking philosophical ideas – but 
not as Kant’s critical philosophy.  Kant’s openness was function of his own 
mind and his exceptional intellectual honesty. Therefore, Kant’s critical 
philosophy was seen as a starting point and not a completed system or as a 
finish system, and not having finalized endpoint.  Kant at the end of the 
first Critique of Pure Reason (1781) says, “The critical path alone remains 
open.” (Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen.) AK 3: 552.  In fact, so 
many philosophical paths were open and taken after Kant, and most of 
them would not have pleased Kant. Even beyond Kant’s public statements 
against Fichte at the end, in private, he was even more upset over Fichte’s 
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philosophy and Kant wanted to make sure he was no longer connected to 
Fichte in the public eye.   
Kant wanted followers and so having major parts of the popular 
philosophical world going off recklessly following Jacob (faith) or Lessing 
(pantheism) or Mendelssohn (common sense and old rational metaphysics) 
or Herder and Hamann; so in fact, this did not bode well for the followers 
or popular option of Kant’s own critical philosophy.  I think that Kant was 
partial involved in the Atheism Controversy (1798-1800) and since his 
named was linked with Fichte (who was dismissed from Jena University in 
1799 for Atheism).  Fichte was attacked by Jacobi in 1799.  The elder Kant 
had to distance himself as much as possible from Atheism and Fichte. 
Thus, we see Kant’s own attack against Fichte in 1799 (7 August); the title 
is: Declaration Regarding Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (Erklärung in 
Beziehung auf Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre). (AK 12:370-71).  Again this is 
Kant telling his followers – Kant is to be read and one should not take 
anyone else’s version of Kant’s philosophy as being correct. As we have 
seen on this account, Fichte was not the heir apparent after all. In fact, he 
was pushed out of the fold by Kant.  
Kant wrote about Fichte, “Since the reviewer finally maintains that 
the Critique is not to be taken literally in what it says about sensibility and 
that anyone who wants to understand the Critique must first master the 
requisite standpoint (of Beck or of Fichte), because Kant's precise words, 
like Aristotle’s, will destroy the spirit, I therefore declare again that the 
Critique is to be understood by considering exactly what it says and that it 
requires only the common standpoint that any mind sufficiency cultivated 
in such abstract investigations will bring to it.” (AK 12: 371).  1799.  
Needless to say, Kant was trying to salvage his philosophy and his 
overall place in history.  For Kant what was at stake in the Pantheism 
Controversy? The short answer: Kant’s legacy; and indeed his reputation 
and the general status of the critical philosophy.  Kant did show some 
hubris about the critical philosophy.  Enlightenment (Aufklärung) brings 
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back a Kantian version of strong rationalism. Kant’s entire conception of 
“pure reason”: transcendental idealism or critical idealism is still 
encompassed in his overall rationalism.  
Conclusion: the purpose of Kant’s orientation essay was to re-direct 
the pantheism controversy back from Spinoza (et alia, and others) and 
other issues (faith, deism) in the total return to Kant’s critical philosophy.  
It was marketing the critical philosophy to his disciples, supporters, and 
Kant’s followers.  Moreover, Kant wanted to bring more intellectuals into 
the Kantian fold and Kant’s view of the critical philosophy. Kant wanted to 
overcome the other philosophical and theological worldviews at the time. 
The broad intellectual public had to understand Enlightenment and Kant’s 
critical philosophy.  
 
Translator’s Foot Note #1: Kant wrote in the Preface to the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), “Thus, I had to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.” (Ich mußte also das Wissen 
aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen) (AK 3:19 Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft).  
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In German, this page has links to theological controversy, so a starting 
place on research for these topics.  
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kategorie:Theologische_Kontroverse 
General background on rationalism 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalism 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 
Series Editors: Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer.  
Titles in English of Kant’s writings for this series: 
Anthropology, History, and Education 
Correspondence 
Critique of the Power of Judgment 
Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant: Natural Science 
Lectures on Anthropology 
Lectures on Ethics 
Lectures on Logic 
Lectures on Metaphysics 
Notes and Fragments 
Opus Postumum 
Practical Philosophy 
Religion and Rational Theology 
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 
Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 
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Kant’s Note on his Overall Philosophical Position. 
 
The following note from the elder Kant, I find to be very interesting in the 
overall understanding of what Kant thought he was actually doing. It is 
from his later period, and the date is from around 1797.  
AK 18:667 to AK 18:668 
Notation on timeline for this note: ω4: 1796 - 1798.  
Dated time lines of these hand written notes by Erich Adickes and his 
assistant Friedrich Berger. Adickes came up with 22 distinct time periods 
in which to sort Kant’s hand written notes (Nachlaß). This note is dated 
toward the end of Kant’s life. Kant died in 1804 at age 79.  
From: Notes and Fragments By Kant.  
6343. 1796–98 (around May 1797). LBl D 12. P. I.  
“The final aim of all metaphysics is to ascend from the cognition of the 
sensible to that of the supersensible. Now the Critique of Pure Reason 
proves that this can never be accomplished in a theoretical respect, but it 
can very well be done in a morally-practical respect by means of the 
transcendental concept of freedom, which in respect to the theoretical 
faculty of cognition is [crossed out: fully] transcendent and absolutely 
inexplicable and indemonstrable, but which with respect to the pure 
practical faculty (determinable through pure reason alone) has indubitable 
reality through the categorical imperative. – The reality of the concept of 
freedom, however, inevitably brings with it the doctrine of the ideality of 
objects as objects of intuition in space and time. For if these intuitions were 
not merely subjective forms of sensibility, but rather of objects in 
themselves, then their practical use, i.e., actions, would depend entirely on 
the mechanism of nature, and freedom together with its consequence, 
morality, would be annihilated.  
Bottom page. Translator notes: Several disconnected phrases at the end of 
this note are omitted: “In accordance with the letters, not the intended 
spirit”; “what the same man says in [this?] connection”; “An insurrection 
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of dogmatists in measure.”. Translation by Paul Guyer et al.  
 
Complete German text from online AA. Elektronische Edition der 
Gesammelten Werke Immanuel Kants. 
AK 18:667 to AK 18:668 
http://www.korpora.org/Kant/aa18/667.html 
6343.   ω4 (etwa Mai 1797).   L Bl. D 12.   S. I, II.   R I 217. 
 ω4: 1796 - 1798.  
Dated time lines of Kant’s notes are by Erich Adickes and his assistant 
Friedrich Berger.  
6343.   ω4 (etwa Mai 1797).   L Bl. D 
12.   S. I, II.   R I 217. 
  
      
  19 S. I:       
  
20 Die Endabsicht aller Metaphysik ist, von der Erkentnis 
des Sinnlichen 
      
  
21 zu der des Übersinnlichen aufzusteigen. Die Critik d. r. 
V. beweiset 
      
  
22 nun, daß dieses nie in theoretischer, wohl aber in 





      
  
01 ausgerichtet werden könne vermittelst des 
transscendentalen Begrifs 
      
  
02 der Freyheit, der in Absicht Rücksicht auf 
das theoretische Erkentnisvermögen 
      
  03 vollig transscendent und vollig absolut unerklär       
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lich und unerweislich, 
  
04 in Hinsicht aber auf das 
reine practische (durch blo reine 
      
  
05 Vernunft allein bestimbare) Vermögen aber 
durch den categorisch en Imperativ 
      
  
06 völlig unbezweifelte Realität hat. — Die 
Realität des Freyheitsbegrifs 
      
  
07 aber zieht unvermeidlicherweise die Lehre von 
der Idealität der 
      
  
08 Gegenstände so fern sie als Objecte ihrer der 
Anschauung im Raume und 
      
  
09 der Zeit nach sich. Denn wären diese 
Anschauungen nicht blos su bjective 
      
  
10 Formen der Sinnlichkeit, sondern der 
Gegenstände an sich, so würde der 
      
  
11 practische Gebrauch derselben, d. i. die 
Handlungen würden der schlechterdings 
      
  
12 nur von den Mechanism der Natur abhängen, 
und Freyheit sammt 
      
  13 (
g
 ihrer Folge ) der Moralität wäre vernichtet.       
            
  14 S. II:       
  
15 Dem Buchstaben nach, nicht dem 
Vermeynten Geist. 
      
            
  16 In umgekehrter Richtung:       
  
17 was eben derselbe Mann im Zusammenhange 
sagt. 
      
            
  18 Ein Aufstand der Dogmatiker in Masse. 
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(einschließlich ihrer Nachfolger Berlinische Blätter und Neue 
Berlinische Monatsschrift).  Hrsg.: J. E. Biester, F. Gedike, 
Berlin, Germany. 
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Caption: this is the first page of Immanuel Kant’s article in German 
from the original publication of 1786.  
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